Euro-Med Engagement
The 27-member Euro-Med Partnership, launched at the much-ballyhooed Barcelona Conference in 1995, consists of three "baskets." The economic basket is paramount. Aiming to establish a Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010, the 15 members of the European Union promised aid through the Mediterranean Development Assistance (MEDA) program in exchange for market reforms. The strategic basket, whose ultimate goal is the creation of a "common area of peace and stability," has started slowly, with some statements and initiatives on human rights and political reforms. Although under-funded in comparison to MEDA, the multidimensional socio-cultural basket of research, conferences and projects on Mediterranean antiquities, history, ecology, contemporary arts and the like seems to have captured intellectual imagination-as well as commercial interest-especially in France, Spain and Italy.
There are three concentric circles of Euro-Med engagement. Three aspirants to full-fledged membership in the Sheila Carapico teaches political science at the University of Richmond.
European Union-Cyprus, Malta and Turkey-are assessed periodically for their progress toward meeting a range of EU accession criteria, including human rights standards.' The 12 partners in the envisioned Mediterranean free trade zone are these three plus Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria.2 All of these have signed or are negotiating association agreements. Beyond the Mediterranean basin, Brussels is also negotiating a free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), itself a free trade zone comprised of the Gulf monarchies.3
The impetus for the Barcelona Process, as Euro-Med is also known, came from several directions simultaneously. After the formation of the World Trade Organization, the European Community hoped to enhance markets and investments in foreign countries close to home. Xenophobes fearful that Arabs and Turks will overrun a continent were crying for policies to stem immigration, while the deteriorating situation in Algeria in the mid-1990s raised the specter of Islamist radicalism spilling into Europe. In addition, French and British colonial legacies and Italian, Spanish and Greek merchant empires underlie particular interests that those countries hoped to advance via Euro-Med engagement. At the same time, their preferences for programs in the newly independent states notwithstanding, northern European companies sought direct outlets to the Mediterranean region. Lastly, of course, North Africa is both a source of petroleum for Europe and its gateway to more oil in the Persian Gulf.
Invitation to an Elite Party
It has also been suggested that after the US seized the peace process from Europe at Madrid and Oslo, the Euro-Med conferences served as an alternative to the moribund multilateral tracks of the US-orchestrated Arab-Israeli negotiations. Every US administration has favored one-on-one bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and a focus on this conflict even to the exclusion of other issues. Washington puts most of its eggs in a few baskets, with generous aid to Israel and Egypt and a special security relationship with Saudi Arabia. If the US tends toward unilateral policies and bilateral approaches, the Euro-Med framework is inherently multilateral. Euro-Med invites everyone to an elite party, casting a broader and potentially more viable net around issues of common concern like the environment, shipping and communications. 
